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JURISDICTION
The Court lacks jurisdiction over this case because the
appeal was not timely filed.1

The Commission issued its

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision on
October 28, 1992.

(R. 23-27).

On November 16, 1992 Knowledge

Data Systems ("Petitioner") filed a Request for Reconsideration.
(R. 20-22).

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a), a

party is required to file a petition for judicial review "within
30 days after the date that the order constituting the final
agency action is issued or is considered to have been issued."
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b 14(3) (a).
signed by the Commission.

The order is issued when

See Dusty's Inc. v. Utah State Tax

Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1992).
Section 63-46b-13 allows a party to file a request for
reconsideration with the agency "within 20 days after the date
that an order is issued. . . if the order would otherwise
constitute a final agency action. . .."

However, under 63-46b-

13(3)(b)(1992) an order denying a request for reconsideration is
deemed to be issued 20 days after the filing of the request if no
action is taken by the agency.
On November 16, 1992, Petitioner filed its Request for
Reconsideration on the Tax Commission's October 28, 1992 Final

*. Failure to file a timely appeal is jurisdictional in nature
and can be raised at any time during the appellate proceedings.
See Leonczvnski v. Indus. Comm'n. 713 P.2d 706 (Utah 1985).
1

Decision.

(R. 20-22).

No action was taken by the Tax Commission

within 20 days from the date the Petition for Reconsideration was
filed.

Therefore, pursuant to the express language of § 63-46b-

13(3)(b), an order denying Petitioner's Request for
Reconsideration was deemed to have been issued on December 7,
1992.

However, Petitioner can still " . . . file a Petition for

judicial review within 30 days after the order . . . is
considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b)."
As such, Petitioner should have filed an appeal of that order by
January 6, 1993.

Petitioner did not file for judicial review

until February 12, 1993, which is beyond the 30 day statutory
limit.

(R. 6). Accordingly, the appeal is untimely and the

Court lacks jurisdiction.
It should be noted that Petitioner's attorney, Gary Kueltzo,
noted some concern regarding the deemed denial period as
evidenced in his letter to the Tax Commission on December 10,
1992.2

(R. 13). This letter indicates that Petitioner's

attorney was familiar with the Utah Tax Code and understood the
effect of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b). However, Petitioner
cannot rely on the fact that its attorney's letter, which raises
the 20 day deemed denial issue, serves to extend the time for
judicial review.
2

The original copy of Gary Kueltzo's December 10, 1992,
letter shows handwriting presumably from Alan Hennebold, Utah State
Tax Commission Hearing Officer, stating the following: "Called 1214-92. 2 p.m. Left answer w/K's sec."
2

First, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) specifically states that
an agency does not have the authority to extend the time
requirements allowed for judicial review.

Utah Code Ann* § 63-

46b-l(9) states:
"Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict
a presiding officer, for good cause shown, from
lengthening or shortening any time period prescribed in
this chapter, except those time periods established for
judicial review." (Emphasis added).
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court recently held that the Tax
Commission cannot expand the time period established for judicial
review.

See Dusty's Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep.

7 (Utah 1992).

Therefore, because both the statute and case

authority forbid state agencies from extending the time for
judicial review, Petitioner cannot claim that an extension had
been granted by the Tax Commission merely because its attorney
mentioned the deemed denial period in a letter.
Furthermore, although the Tax Commission eventually issued
its January 15, 1993 Order confirming the denial of the
Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration, this Order does not
have the effect of extending Petitioner's rights to obtain
judicial review since the request for reconsideration was deemed
to have been denied by operation of law on December 7, 1992. The
language of § 63-46b-l(9) expressly prohibits such action.
This Court reached a similar conclusion in Hase v. Hase, 775
P.2d 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Hase involved an appeal from a

district court decision, but its reasoning is applicable to the
3

facts of the case at bar.

In Hase the court issued a final

divorce decree on December 31, 1987, which disposed of all the
Petitioner's claims.

On January 15, 1989, the Petitioner filed a

tardy "Objection to Order" pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b).

On

February 5, 1988, the district court issued a "consolidated
findings of fact, conclusions of law, decree of divorce, and
order."

Petitioner then filed an appeal on March 4, 1988.

The Petitioner in Hase argued that its appeal was timely
since it was filed within 30 days of the district court's
February 5, 1988 decision.

This Court rejected this argument by

stating:
The Consolidated Decree of Divorce and Orders
merely reiterated what the court had
previously ordered in several different
orders, referred to those orders specifically
by date in most instances, and joined them in
one document, as appellants request. We find
that such an order cannot be used to extend
the time for appeal because it does not
resolve any issues extant, but merely refers
to prior orders of the court.
Id. at 945.

(Emphasis added).

The Petitioner in Hase also argued that its tardy "Objection
to Order" should stay the 30 day filing requirement for an
appeal.

This Court rejected that argument as well, stating that

because the objection was not filed within 10 days as required,
the objection did not qualify as a post-judgment order, which
would have suspended the time for appealing the December 31, 1987
final order.

Id.; see also Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320
4

(Utah 1982) (a tardy request for a new trial cannot stay the time
limits imposed upon appeals); Vanionora v. Draper, 30 Utah 2d
364, 517 P.2d 1320 (1974) (failure to file a motion for a new
trial does not stay the time constraints governing appeals).3
Both the relevant statutes and the cited case law support
the proposition that the agency has no authority to extend the
time for judicial review.
in nature, not procedural.

As cited earlier, it is jurisdictional
As such, Petitioner is unable to

argue that filing within 30 days of the Tax Commission's January
15, 1993 Order was timely.

Utah courts have strictly enforced

the time requirements for the filing of an appeal.

In Isaacson

v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court
refused to extend the 30 day time limit for filing an appeal that
was filed two days beyond the time limit.

Moreover, in Dusty's

Inc., the Utah Supreme Court also held that the 30 day time limit
runs from the date of the issuance of the final decision, not the
date of notice to the parties.
The Legislature has established the time frame for seeking
judicial review of agency action.

By specifically tying the time

to file for review to the date a motion for reconsideration is
deemed denied, the legislature has set a time certain within
3

Federal courts have long recognized that tardy motions for
reconsideration cannot toll the statute of limitations governing
appeals even if the trial court hears the motion for
reconsideration. See Denlev v. Shearson/American Exp. Inc., 733
F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155 (3rd Cir.
1988); Martinez v. Trainer, 556 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1977).
5

which an appeal must be filed.

It has specifically prohibited

the Commission from extending that time.

Therefore, the issuance

of a written order confirming that a motion for reconsideration
has been denied, by operation of law, cannot have the effect of
extending the time to seek judicial review.

The provisions of §

63-46b-14(3)(a) are tied to the provisions of § 63-46b-13(3)(b),
to ensure that a petition for reconsideration does not
indefinitely delay the time for filing for an appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

The Tax Commission properly concluded that Petitioner's

subsequent use of the computer equipment taken in trade was
subject to Utah use taxes.
A,

The proper standards of review for all issues

raised in this case under UAPA is the "abuse of discretion"
standard for statutory interpretation and "not supported by
substantial evidence" standard for findings of fact.
Standard of Review:

The Court should review this factual

determination under the "substantial evidence" standard pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g), or under § 59-1-610 (1992
Supp. 1993).
II.

Petitioner cannot rely upon the "isolated or occasional

sale exemption" because Petitioner acquired the used computer
equipment in trade, not from a sale.
Standard of Review: The Court should review the Tax
Commission's application of the facts to the law under the "abuse
6

of discretion standard" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b16(4)(h)(i) or under § 59-1-610/
III. Petitioner is not entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
A.

Issues not raised in the proceedings below cannot

be raised for the first time on appeal.
B.

Petitioner's § 1988 claim is improper because Utah

law provides an adequate remedy to address erroneous tax
assessments.
C.

The Tax Assessed Against Petitioner Does Not

Violate the Commerce Clause Nor 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Standard of Review: The Court should review this question of
law by applying the "correction of error" standard pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Set forth verbatim in Appendix 1.
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(14) (1992).

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a) (1992).

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(14) (1992).

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(19) (1992).

5.

Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-l(9) (1989 & Supp. 1992)

*. If this appeal is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610,
which became effective on May 3, 1993, the applicable standard of
review to be applied to conclusions of law. Mixed questions of law
and fact should be determined based on implied or implicit grants
of discretion pursuant to Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983).
7

6.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1989 & Supp. 1992).

7.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1989 & Supp. 1992).

8.

Utah Admin. R. 86-19-72S (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves a sales and use tax assessment against
Knowledge Data Systems, Inc. ("Petitioner") for its failure to
remit sales and use taxes for its subsequent use of computer
equipment taken in trade. An audit conducted by the Auditing
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission revealed that
Petitioner was liable for $15,396.99 plus interest for its use of
the computei: equipment.

The case was submitted to the Tax

Commission upon stipulated facts and oral arguments on April 13,
1992.

The Tax Commission held that Petitioner was the ultimate

consumer of the computer equipment and upheld the tax assessment
against Petitioner.

Petitioner subsequently filed a Request for

Reconsideration, which was deemed denied on December 7, 1992, and
subsequently confirmed on January 15, 1993. Petitioner appealed
the Tax Commission's October 28, 1992, Final Decision and the
January 15, 1993 Order denying Petitioner's Request for
Reconsideration to the Utah Supreme Court.

The case was

transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals on May 17, 1993.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Stipulated Facts
This case was submitted to the Tax Commission on the
stipulated facts and the arguments of the parties at the formal

8

hearing.

Both parties agree and stipulate to the following

facts:
1.

That Knowledge Data Systems, Inc. ("Petitioner") is in

the business of selling computer systems (hardware and software)
at retail both inside and outside Utah.
2.

(R. 47).

That Petitioner sold a computer system to the

University of Minnesota Hospital and Clinic (hereinafter "U.
Minn.") and took in trade used computer hardware which
Petitioners had previously sold to them.
3.

(R. 47).

That U. Minn, is not in the business of selling new or

used computer hardware, but rather is a patient care facility.
(R. 48).
4.

That the equipment Petitioner took in trade was used by

Petitioner in its business in Utah and was booked to a fixed
asset account and was not held for subsequent sale in an
inventory account.
5.

(R. 48).

That I.C.I. America's (hereinafter " ICI") is in the

business of selling wholesale pharmaceutical supplies and is not
in the business of selling new or used computer hardware.

(R.

48).
6.

That Petitioner purchased used computer hardware from

ICI in conjunction with providing a new computer system to ICI.
(R. 48).

9

7.

That Petitioner used a portion of the computer hardware

in its trade or business and held a portion of the hardware for
resale in its inventory account.
8.

(R. 48).

That neither U. Minn, or ICI is registered with the

Utah Department of Revenue to sell tangible personal property at
retail in Utah.

(R. 48).
Other Relevant Facts

Petitioner sold new equipment to U. Minn, and as
partial consideration for the sale, Petitioner took used computer
equipment in trade from U. Minn.

(R 24, 47-48).

Furthermore,

Petitioner sold new equipment to ICI and as partial consideration
for the sale, Petitioner took used computer equipment in trade
from ICI. (R. 24, 48).
Additionally, U. Minn, did not actually sell its used
computer equipment to Petitioner, rather, U Minn, traded in its
used equipment as partial consideration in order to acquire new
computer equipment from Petitioner.

(R. 24, 47-48).

Furthermore, ICI did not actually sell its used computer
equipment to Petitioner, rather ICI traded in the used equipment
as partial consideration in order to acquire new computer
equipment.

(R. 24, 25, 48).
Procedural History

The Auditing Division conducted an audit of Petitioner for
the audit period of July 1987 through June 1990. The results of
the audit indicated that Petitioner was liable for $15,396.99 tax
10

assessment.

(R. 70-71).

On April 15, 1991, Petitioner filed for

redetermination with the Tax Commission in connection with the
tax assessment.

(R. 67-69).

On April 13, 1992, the Tax Commission conducted a hearing
for oral arguments.

(Transcript).

Subsequently, on October 28,

1992 the Tax Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Final Decision.

(R. 23-28).

On November 16, 1992, Petitioner filed a Request for
Reconsideration of the Tax Commission's October 28, 1992 Final
Decision.

(R. 20-22).

However, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-

46b-14(3)(a) (1992), an order denying Petitioner's Request for
Reconsideration was deemed to have been issued on December 7,
1992.

Petitioner failed to timely file for judicial review of

final agency action within 30 days after Petitioner's Request for
Reconsideration was deemed denied pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-14(3)(a) (1992).
On January 15, 1993, the Tax Commission issued an Order
confirming the denial of Petitioner's Request for
Reconsideration.

Subsequently, on February 12, 1993, Petitioner

filed its Petition for Review of Final Decision, wherein
Petitioner seeks review of the Tax Commission's October 28, 1992
Final Decision and the January 15, 1993 Order.

The Utah Supreme

Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeal.

11

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court should review the Tax Commission's Final Decision
under the "abuse of discretion" and "not supported by substantial
evidence" standards of review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-16(4)(g), and (h)(i) (1992).

This Court must sustain the Tax

Commission's finding that Petitioner did not qualify for the
"isolated or occasional sales" exemption from sales and use taxes
unless this finding is not supported by substantial evidence.
The record indicates that Petitioner acquired the used computer
equipment in trade and became the ultimate consumer of the
equipment when Petitioner used the equipment for its own business
purposes.

Therefore, because the Tax Commission's factual

finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, this
Court should uphold the Tax Commission's Final Decision.
Furthermore, given the broad and general terms of the
relevant statutes and the authority of the Tax Commission to
administer the tax laws, the Tax Commission has been given an
implicit grant of authority from the legislature.

As such, the

Tax Commission's finding cannot be overturned unless it has
abused its discretion.

Therefore, under the applicable standards

of review, this Court should affirm the Tax Commission's Final
Decision and subsequent Order.

However, even if § 59-1-610

supersedes the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") in
this case, the court must defer to findings of the Tax Commission

12

since it has only made factual findings.

There are no

interpretations of law at issue.
In the present case, the Tax Commission properly concluded
that Petitioner's subsequent use of the computer equipment that
it acquired in trade constituted a taxable transaction.

Use or

consumption of tangible personal property constitutes a separate
taxable event.
authority.

This conclusion is supported by statute and case

The stipulated facts indicate that Petitioner

acquired used computer equipment in trade and subsequently used
the equipment for its own business purposes.

Pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 59-12-104(19) (1992), the initial acquisition of the
traded-in equipment is exempt from sales and use taxes.

However,

pursuant to Utah Admin. R. R865-19-72S (1992), the subsequent
sale or use of the tangible personal property that has been
acquired in trade constitutes a taxable transaction.

Utah case

law and other authority support the proposition that a tax is
levied upon the ultimate consumer.

In the case at bar,

Petitioner is the ultimate consumer because it used the traded-in
equipment for its own business purposes and did not hold the
equipment for resale.
Given the nature of the trade-in situation, Petitioner is
unable to qualify for the "isolated or occasional sale" exemption
from sales or use taxes.

The facts indicate that the out-of-

state purchasers bought new computer equipment from Petitioner in
the Petitioner's normal course of business.
13

As partial

consideration for the new computer equipment, the out-of-state
purchasers traded-in their old equipment.

Because Petitioner

acquired its used computer equipment under the typical trade in
situation, Petitioner cannot claim the "isolated or occasional
sale" exemption pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(14)
(1992).

Therefore, this Court should affirm the sales and use

taxes assessed against Petitioner as found by the Tax Commission
in its Final Decision.
Finally, Petitioner cannot claim relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C
§ 1983 and § 1988 for three important reasons.

First, the issue

of attorneys' fees was never raised in the proceedings below.
Second, because Utah provides an adequate remedy by which
taxpayers can become whole after an erroneous assessment, this
court should not extend a § 1988 remedy that has not been
provided for by the legislature.

Finally, pursuant to Utah law

all tangible personal property taken in trade that is
subsequently used or sold constitutes a taxable transaction.
This rule is true regardless of the origin of the property.

As

such, this tax does not violate the Commerce Clause and
therefore, Petitioner's request for attorneys' fees pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1988 must be denied.

14

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TAX COMMISSION PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER'S
SUBSEQUENT USE OF THE COMPUTER EQUIPMENT TAKEN IN TRADE
WAS SUBJECT TO UTAH USE TAXES.
A.

THE PROPER STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR ALL ISSUES
RAISED IN THIS CASE UNDER UAPA IS THE "ABUSE
OF DISCRETION" STANDARD FOR STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND "NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE" STANDARD FOR FINDINGS
OF FACT.

The Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") outlines the
various situations in which a court may grant relief and the
associated standards of review to be applied in granting such
relief.

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1992).

The two

standards of review applicable in this case are the "abuse of
discretion" standard for statutory interpretation and "not
supported by substantial evidence" standard for findings of fact.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g), and (h)(i) (1992).
This Court must sustain the Tax Commission's finding that
Petitioner did not qualify for the "occasional or isolated sale"
exemption to Utah sales and use taxes because Petitioner acquired
used equipment in trade from U. Minn, and ICI in trade as partial
consideration for underlying sales of new equipment. Later,
Petitioner used the trade-in equipment for its own use.

Unless

this finding is not supported by substantial evidence, the
Commission's decision should be upheld.

Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-

16(4)(g) (1992) and Zissi v. Tax Comm'n. 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah
1992).
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In applying this standard the Court must consider both the
evidence that supports the challenged finding and the evidence
that cuts against such finding.

Stewart v. Board of Review, 831

P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

This standard does not

permit the reviewing court to weigh of the evidence itself, but
only requires the court to determine whether the fact finder's
weighing was reasonable.

Semeco v. Tax Comm'n, 209 Utah Adv.

Rep. 73, 77 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting).
The case at bar was submitted to the Tax Commission on the
stipulated facts and arguments of the parties at the formal
hearing.

The Tax Commission found that Petitioner sold new

computer equipment to U. Minn, and ICI and received used
equipment from each entity in trade as partial consideration for
the sale of the new equipment.

(R. 24). The Tax Commission also

found that the used equipment that Petitioner took in trade was
used in Petitioner's business operations.

(R. 25). Furthermore,

the Tax Commission also found that Petitioner's subsequent use of
the equipment taken in trade was the taxable event.

(R. 26). As

such, the Tax Commission correctly determined that Petitioner did
not qualify for an "isolated or occasional sale" exemption, given
the fact that Petitioner acquired the used equipment in trade.
(R. 27).
The Utah Supreme Court has previously applied the
substantial evidence standard in O'Rourke v. Tax Comm'n, 830 P.2d
230 (Utah 1992) and affirmed a Tax Commission finding that a
16

taxpayer was domiciled in Utah and thereby subject to Utah income
taxes.

Therefore, this Court should remain consistent and

sustain the Tax Commission's finding since it is support€>d by
substantial evidence in the record•
With respect to the Tax Commission's application of the
facts to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 and § 59-12-104(14)f the
proper standard of review is "abuse of discretion."

In

discussing this standard of review under the UAPA, the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
Under UAPA, this court reviews an agency decision which
interprets statutory law using the correction of error
standard found in section 63-46b-16(4)(d), unless the
legislature has granted the agency discretion in
interpreting and administering the statute. Agency
discretion may be either express or implied and, if
granted, results in review of the agency action for an
abuse of discretion under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i).
Nucor Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah 1992)
(footnotes omitted).5

Thus, if either express or implied

discretion is found, the proper standard of review is Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i), which provides:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
•

•

•

(h) the agency action is:
5

. The Supreme Court has also stated, "[i]n many cases where
we would summarily grant an agency deference on the basis of its
expertise, it is also appropriate to grant the agency deference on
the basis of an explicit or implicit grant of discretion contained
in the governing statute."
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing
Division, 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991).
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(i) an abuse of discretion delegated to the
agency by statute;• • .
This Court in Kino v. Industrial Comm'n, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 33,
37 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) also articulated an analytical model
derived from the Supreme Court cases dealing with this standard
of review.

The threshold step is to determine whether there has

been an explicit grant from the legislature to the agency of
deference to interpret the specific statutory language.

Id.

If

there is no explicit grant of authority, the next step is to
determine whether implicit authority is granted.

Implicit

authority can be inferred if the "statutory language is broad and
expansive or subject to numerous interpretations. . ."

Id.

Courts have also recognized implicit authority when there is an
absence of discernible legislative history and the agency
determination is the type of determination the agency routinely
performs.

Putvin v. Tax Comm'n 837 P.2d 589 (Utah Ct. App.

1992), citing Morton Int'l, Inc., 814 P.2d at 592.
In the case at bar, the legislature has granted the Tax
Commission general discretion to administer and supervise the tax
laws of the state.

See Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-210(3), (5) (1992).

Similarly , there is implicit discretion granted to the Tax
Commission from the fact that sections 59-12-102(8)(a), which
defines retail sale, and 59-12-104(14), which states the
exemption for isolated and occasional sales, are broad and
subject to a variety of different interpretations.
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Therefore,

this Court should apply the "abuse of discretion" standard when
reviewing the reasonableness of the Tax Commission's
determinations.6
Even if this Court were to find the proper standard were an
intermediate "correction of error," "corrections," or
"reasonableness" standard, the Tax Commission's Final Decision
should be affirmed.

The record shows that the Tax Commission

relied upon the parties' stipulated facts and the parties'
arguments to determine whether Petitioner's equipment taken in
trade was exempt from sales and use taxes.
uphold the decision below on that basis.

Thus, this Court must

The Tax Commission has

not exceeded their authority in statutory interpretationf but has
carefully weighed and applied the stipulated facts to the
statutory standard.
Having framed the standard of review, the following facts
show that the Tax Commission properly found Petitioner's
subsequent use of the computer equipment constituted a taxable
event.

Petitioner is engaged in the business of selling computer

systems at retail both inside and outside of Utah.

(Record at

24, 47; Transcript at 14). Petitioner sold a new computer system

6

. If this appeal is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610,
which became effective on May 3, 1993, the applicable standard of
review to be applied to "mixed questions of law and fact," like the
Tax Commission's finding that Petitioner did not qualify for the
"isolated or occasional sales" exemption, is "abuse of discretion."
See Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n 658 P.2d
601, 610 (Utah 1983).
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to U. Minn, and took in trade used "computer hardware.

(R. 24,

25, 47; T. 14, 15). Additionally, Petitioner acquired a used
computer system from ICI in conjunction with providing ICI with a
new computer system.

(R. 24, 25, 48). The equipment that

Petitioner acquired from U. Minn, was used in its business in
Utah, booked to a fixed asset account, and not held for resale.
(R. 24, 48). Similarly, the equipment that Petitioner acquired
from ICI was partially used by Petitioner in its business,
although some of the equipment was also held for resale.

(R. 24,

48; Transcript at 11). The Tax Commission properly concluded
that the material taken in trade and then subsequently used by
Petitioner in its business constituted a taxable event.

(R. 26).

This conclusion is supported both by statute and case authority.
In th€* case at bar, the tax has been assessed on
Petitioner's subsequent use of the computer equipment that it
took in trade, not the manner in which Petitioner acquired the
equipment.

In fact, the initial transaction by which Petitioner

acquired the used computer equipment is exempt from sales taxes
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(19) (1992).

However,

Petitioner's subsequent use of the used computer equipment for
its own business purposes is not exempt from sales and use taxes.
In essence, this case is analogous to the typical trade-in
scenario when a car dealer takes in trade a used automobile as
partial consideration for the sale of a new car, but instead of
placing the used car on the lot for resale, the dealer uses the
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used car for other business purposes,7

In this example, the

trade-in transaction is not the taxable event, rather, it is the
subsequent use or consumption of the traded-in vehicle by the
ultimate user that constitutes the taxable event.

To this issue,

the Utah legislature created a statutory exemption for the
initial trade-in transaction.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(19)

(1992) states:
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes
imposed by this chapter:
(19) tangible personal property, other than
money, traded in as full or part payment of the
purchase price, except that for purpose of
calculating sales or use tax upon vehicles not
sold by a vehicle dealer, trade-ins are limited
to other vehicles only, and the tax is based upon
the then existing fair market value of the
vehicle being sold and the vehicle traded in, as
determined by the commission;
For purposes of clarifying this statute, the Tax Commission
promulgated the following rules:
Trade-ins and Exchanges Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12102
A. An even exchange of tangible personal property for
tangible personal property is exempt from tax. When a
person takes tangible personal property as part payment on
7

. Utah Code Ann. 59-12-102(14)(a), (b) (1992) defines "use"
in the following manner: (a) "Use" means the exercise of any right
or power over tangible personal property under Subsection 59-12103(1), incident to the ownership or leasing of that property,
item, or service. (b) "Use" does not include the sale, display,
demonstration, or trial of that property in the regular course of
business and held for resale. See e.g., Merrill Bean Chevrolet,
Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 549 P. 2d 443 (Utah 1976) (automobiles
used for display to stimulate sales does not constitute "use" by
the auto dealer).
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a sale of tangible personal property, sales or use tax
applies only to any consideration valued in money which
changes hands.
B. For example, if a car is sold for $8,500 and a credit of
$6,500 is allowed for a used car taken in trade, the sales
or use tax
applies to the difference, or $2,000 in this
example.8 Subsequently, when the used car is sold, tax
applies to the selling price less any trade-in at that
time.
C. An actual exchange of tangible personal property between
two persons must be made before this exemption applies. . .
Utah Admin. R. R865-19-72S (1992) (emphasis added).
This rule broadens the scope of the trade-in exemption to
transactions involving all forms of tangible personal property,
not merely automobiles.

As such, both the statute and the rules

cited above are applicable to the case at bar.

Petitioner

acquired the used computer equipment as a trade-in for the
underlying sale of new computer equipment to the out of state
purchasers.

After Petitioner acquired the traded-in equipment,

Petitioner then used the equipment in its own business.

Pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(19) (1992), the used equipment that
Petitioner received in trade is exempt from sales and use taxes.
However, pursuant to the rule that accompanies § 59-12-104(19),
when the traded-in equipment is subsequently sold or used, a tax

8

. Note that because Petitioner's underlying sale of its new
equipment to the out-of-state purchasers is a "sale made in
interstate commerce" pursuant to Utah Admin. R. R865-19-44S (1992)
(not subject to sales tax), a tax is not levied upon the difference
between th€> value of the new equipment and the equipment taken in
trade. The Tax Commission similarly found that because the sales
took place outside of Utah, no sales tax could have been levied on
the underlying sale of the new computer equipment. (R. 26).
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is levied upon that transaction•

See Utah Admin, R. R865-19-72S

(1992).
Utah case law supports the proposition that sales tax
applies to all sales of tangible personal property made to the
ultimate consumer.

Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. v. State Tax

Comm'n, 549 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1976); Olson Construction Co. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961).

In

Merrill Bean the Tax Commission assessed a tax on "demonstrator
automobiles" that were being used by the automobile dealer's wife
for her own personal use.

Because the dealer's wife's use of the

demonstrator vehicles was short-lived and because she helped
stimulate sales of those vehicles, the Utah Supreme Court held
that the dealer was not the ultimate consumer despite his wife's
personal use of the demonstrator.

Merrill Bean, 549 P.2d at 446.

However, in a case similar to the facts of Merrill Bean,
the Georgia Supreme Court held that a taxable transaction
occurred when a dealer's wife used a demonstrator automobile for
her personal use for longer than a six month period.

See Law

Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Strickland, 271 S.E.2d 152 (Ga. 1980).
In discussing the concept of ultimate use by the car dealer, the
Georgia court held that since the demonstrator vehicles were used
for personal use as well as for display over an extended period
of time, the dealer was liable for sales taxes as the ultimate
consumer of the display vehicles.
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Id. at 154. The court also

stated:
[w]hen the [car dealer] 'makes any use of the property
other than retention, demonstration, or display while
holding [the automobiles] for sale in the regular
course of business, the use shall be deemed a retail
sale by the purchaser. . ..' The [car dealer] will
the be taxed as though he had purchased the property.
If he thereafter sells the property to a consuming
purchaser a tax will again be applicable to that sale.
These, however, are two distinct sales transactions
and are independent taxable events. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 155.

Therefore, the Tax Commission's conclusion that

Petitioner's subsequent use of the traded-in computer equipment
is consistent with the rules imposing a tax upon the ultimate
consumer.
Although no Utah case has directly interpreted section 5912-104(19), the Pennsylvania Superior Court discussed the taxable
effect of an automobile that was originally taken in trade and
subsequently sold to a consumer.

In City of Philadelphia v.

Heinel Motors, 16 A.2d 716 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940), the court
states:
When the defendant corporation [Heinel Motors]
proceeds to sell the car accepted by it in trade to a
new purchaser, the latter enters into a totally
distinct and separate transaction and is chargeable
under the ordinance with the tax on the purchase made
by him [the purchaser]. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 764.

Therefore, the court indicates that a separate

taxable event occurs on the subsequent sale of the used vehicles,
and the tax burden is placed upon the purchaser.
Although this case does not involve the resale of used
automobiles taken in trade, the case does involve equipment taken
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in trade and ultimately used by Petitioner in its business. As
such, the reasoning behind the rules cited above apply to this
case as well.

The court in Philadelphia had to determine who the

ultimate purchaser of the automobiles was in order to assess the
sales tax liability.

The court stated that because the sale of

the used car was a separate and distinct transaction, the sales
tax liability fell on the purchaser.

Id. at 764.

Similarly, the

Tax Commission concluded that Petitioner was the ultimate user of
the used computer equipment, which it took in trade.

The

equipment was booked as a fixed asset, evidencing the fact that
Petitioner was the ultimate user of the used equipment.

As such,

the Tax Commission properly concluded that a taxable event
occurred when Petitioner began to use the equipment for its own
business purposes.

(R. 26).

The Tax Commission's finding that Petitioner's subsequent
use was a taxable transaction is consistent with the general rule
that sales tax is levied upon the ultimate consumer. Tummurru
Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah
1990); see also Ralph Child Constr. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 12
Utah 2d 53, 362 P.2d 422 (1961).

The Utah Supreme Court has

defined "used" and "consumed" in the following manner:
From the context of our statute "used" and "consumed"
may be said to express the same meaning—to make use
of, to employ and does not necessarily mean the
immediate destruction or extermination or change in
form of the article or commodity.
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Utah Concrete Products v. State Tax- Comm'n, 101 Utah 513, 125
P.2d 408, 410 (1942).

Thus, under this broad definition it seems

clear that Petitioner's subsequent use of the equipment that it
took in trade, even though it was used for its own business
purposes, would fit within this definition.

Furthermore, because

the used computer equipment was not held for resale, Petitioner
becomes the last person in the chain to have used such equipment
and the ultimate consumer liable for the tax.

See Utah Concrete

Products, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d at 411; see also Merrill Bean
Chevrolet, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 549 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah
1976).
Petitioner's subsequent use of the used computer equipment
can also be compared to the situation when a construction
contractor takes materials out of inventory for use in a
construction contract.

In Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State

Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990), Tummurru was in the
business of constructing modular buildings as well as selling
building materials.

Tummurru argued that the building materials

that its contracting entity acquired from inventory, to be used
in out-of-state construction projects, did not constitute a
taxable transaction.

However, the court rejected Tummurru's

argument by stating the following:
The act of taking the items out of inventory for use
in a construction contract is a retail sale for the
purpose of sales tax because the contractor is the
ultimate consumer . . . Tummurru is therefore liable
for the sales tax due on those items sold to its
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contracting entity for use in 'the out-of-state
construction projects.
Id. at 719.
The reasoning behind Tummurru is applicable to the case at
bar.

First, the Tummurru court determined that Tummurru was the

ultimate consumer.

Similarly, this Court should find that the

Petitioner was the ultimate consumer.. Second, the Tummurru court
also determined that taking the building materials out of
inventory and subsequently using them in the construction
projects constituted a taxable transaction.

In this case,

although Petitioner may not have booked the receipt of the used
equipment into an inventory account, the fact remains that
Petitioner is commonly engaged in the business of selling used
computers that it receives in trade.

Thus, each used computer

that Petitioner receives in trade automatically goes into
inventory whether or not this inventory account step is shown on
the books.

Further proof that traded-in equipment enters

inventory is evidenced by the fact that a portion of the
equipment acquired from ICI was actually placed in an inventory
account for resale.

Therefore, when Petitioner used the

equipment that it received from U. Minn, and ICI for its business
purposes, Petitioner essentially took the equipment from its
inventory and became the ultimate consumer of the equipment.

As

such, the act of taking items out of inventory for subsequent use
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by Petitioner as the ultimate consumer constitutes a taxable
transaction.

See Tummurru Trades Inc.. 802 P.2d at 719.

In sum, Petitioner would not hesitate to admit that a
taxable event occurs when it sells used computer equipment taken
in trade to a third party purchaser.

In the common trade-in and

subsequent sale situation, the purchaser is the ultimate consumer
and is liable for the sales tax.

In a similar manner, Petitioner

cannot argue that it is exempt from sales tax liability merely
because it chose to use the equipment for its own business
instead of choosing to place the used equipment for resale.
In the case at bar, Petitioner constitutes the ultimate consumer
of the used computer equipment and is therefore logically and
legally liable for the tax.
II.

PETITIONER CANNOT RELY UPON THE "ISOLATED OR
OCCASIONAL SALE EXEMPTION" BECAUSE PETITIONER ACQUIRED
THE USED COMPUTER EQUIPMENT IN TRADE, NOT FROM A SALE.

Petitioner's reliance on the "isolated or occasional sales
by persons not regularly engaged in business" exemption from
sales and use tax is misplaced.
104(14) (1992).

See Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-

As the Tax Commission noted in its Final

Decision, statutes that provide for exemptions to general
taxation provisions are strictly construed against the taxpayer
and the taxpayer has the burden of showing entitlement to the
exemption.

(R. 25); see also Parsons Asphalt Products v. Utah

State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1990).

Given the

nature of the trade-in situation in the case at bar, the Tax
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Commission properly concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to
this exemption. (R. 26). The facts show that Petitioner
subsequently used the equipment that it took in trade for its own
business purposes.

Both the Utah Code and the Utah

Administrative Rules specifically explain that the original
trade-in is exempt from sales tax, yet the subsequent sale or
consumption of the used equipment constitutes a taxable event.
See Utah Code -Ann. § 59-12-104(19) (1992); Utah Admin. R. R86519-72S (1992).

As such, the Tax Commission's finding that

although the Petitioner's acquisition of the used equipment that
it received in trade was not taxable, Petitioner's subsequent use
of the equipment in its business constituted the taxable event
consistent with Utah law.

(R. 26). Therefore, Petitioner's

reliance upon the "isolated and occasional sales" exemption and
the cases that interpret that exemption are misplaced because
Petitioner acquired the used computer equipment under a trade-in
situation.

See e.g., L.A. Young Sons Construction Co. v. State

Tax Comm'n, 23 Utah 2d 84, 457 P.2d 973 (1969) (a Utah
construction company that purchased used construction equipment
not of the type regularly sold in the course of the seller's
business, and subsequently used the equipment for its own
business qualified for the "isolated or occasional sale"
exemption from Utah sales and use taxes); Husky Oil v. State Tax
Comm'n, 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976) (a Utah oil refinery company
that purchased used refinery equipment not of the type regularly
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sold in the course of the seller's business, and subsequently
used the equipment for its own qualified for the "isolated or
occasional sale" exemption from Utah sales and use taxes); Geneva
Steel Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208 (1949)
(a Utah steel company that purchased a steel plant and its
inventories located in Utah qualified for the "isolated or
occasional sales" exemption from Utah sales and use tax).
(Emphas i s added).
Even if this Court were to determine that transactions in
question constitute isolated or occasional sales, KDS would still
not qualify under the terms of that exemption.

In the present

case it is imperative to note that KDS buys and sells computer
equipment in its regular cause of business.

These facts make the

Geneva case distinguishable.
In Geneva, however, neither party was engaged in buying or
selling of tangible personal property in the regular cause of its
business.

As such, Geneva, is factually inconsistent with the

case at bar.
Furthermore, at the time the Geneva case was decided the
sales tax statute and the use tax statute were separate.

The

Utah State Tax Commission made a policy decision to apply all
sales tax exemptions to the Use Tax Act.

The Court in Geneva,

noting the legislature's inaction, simply ratified this
procedure.

Thus, the underlying rationale of Geneva is no longer

applicable since the legislature has recently acted by combining
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the two Acts into its present form.

But even before the

statutory union of the Sale and Use Tax Acts, the Geneva court
recognized the existence of two separate taxable transactions
when it stated:
In the Union Portland Cement case, we narrowed
further the scope of the use tax. But this
narrowing did not make the Use Tax Act useless or
a "nullity." Remaining for the use tax to
operate upon is the storage use or other
consumption of property purchased outside of this
state and brought into this state for storage,
use, or other consumption. The sale of property
made outside this state is not subject to our
sales tax, it being a sale which this state
cannot constitutionally tax. But when such
property is brought into this state for storage,
use or other consumption here, thus coming to
rest as an integrated part of the total property
in this state, then the use tax comes into
operation and taxes, not the event of the sale of
the property, but the event of storage, use or
other consumption of that property within this
state, (emphasis added) Id. at 211.
The general public policy of sales tax statutes includes
the concept that a state is entitled to tax property coming to
rest and being consumed within its borders.

In order for

taxpayers to avoid double taxation of tangible personal property,
interstate agreements have been reached whereby one state will
credit sales or use tax paid by a taxpayer for the same item of
property in another state.

Had Minnesota taxed the used computer

equipment allegedly purchased by KDS in Minnesota, the state of
Utah would recognize that payment and credit KDS for any amount
of use tax owed to Utah.

Therefore, KDS bears no undue risk.

However, there is no evidence that this happened.
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The used

computer equipment which KDS has and continues to consume,
conceivably would escape legitimate state taxation if the
arguments of the Petitioner are accepted by this court.

The

validity of the use tax concept should not be so jeopardized.
III. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES PURSUANT
TO 42 U.S.C. S 1988.
X.

Issues Not Raised in the
Proceedings Below Cannot Be Raised
for the First Time on Appeal.

Petitioner's request for attorney's fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 should be summarily denied in this action.

Utah

law clearly establishes that issues not presented in the
proceedings below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
See Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

In

its brief before this court, Petitioner raises for the first time
the issues of a violation of 42 U.S.C § 1983 and a request for
attorneys' fees in connection with that violation pursuant to 4 2
U.S.C. § 1988.

(Brief of Appellant at 15). However, the record

indicates that a violation of § 1983 and attorneys' fees pursuant
to § 1988 have not been plead or put to issue in the proceedings
below.

Therefore, this Court should reject Petitioner's request

for attorneys' fees pursuant to § 1983.
Petitioner may try to argue that this issue has been plead
below in its Request for Reconsideration.

(R. 22). However,

neither that document nor the cases to which it cites mentions a
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violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or attorneys' fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988.9

Furthermore, Petitioner cannot claim that the §

1983 and § 1988 issues were implicitly raised in its Request for
Reconsideration.

This Court has already determined the effect of

issues that allegedly have been "implicitly raised" in the
proceedings below.

In Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, an appellant

urged this court to consider the issue of standing on appeal,
stating that this issue was "broadly speaking . . . raised
below," suggesting that the trial court "implicitly considered"
the standing issue raised on appeal.

However, this Court

rejected the appellant's claim and denied him the opportunity to
raise the standing issue.

Id. at 1359.

Likewise in this case,

this Court should find that the § 1983 and § 1988 have neither
expressly or implicitly been raised in the proceedings below.
Therefore, this Court should deny Petitioner's request for
attorneys' fees in connection with this case.
B.

Petitioner's § 1988 Claim Is
Improper Because Utah Law Provides
An Adequate Remedy To Address
Erroneous Tax Assessments.

The objective of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to interpose federal
courts between the states and the people, as guardians of the
peoples' federal rights.

Patsy v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S.

9

. Note that the case to which Petitioner cites, Kraft General
Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 505 U.S.
, 120 L. Ed. 2d 59
(1992), does not involve a sales tax issue nor does it address the
issue of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation or § 1988 attorneys' fees
claim.
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496, 503 (1982) (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242
(1972)) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, § 1983 does not create

new rights; rather, it merely facilitates enforcing certain
federal rights by providing a federal forum.

Chapman v. Houston

Welfare Rts. Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979).
Although § 1983 challenges may have an extensive reach in
other contexts, there are special limiting concerns when the
dispute involves the collection and assessment of state taxes.
The Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, specifically provides
that federal "district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of such State."

The policies embodied within the

Act create an impenetrable barrier to contesting state taxes in
federal court.

Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNarv,

454 U.S. 100 (1981)(federal courts cannot entertain actions for
damages under § 1983 for alleged denial of federal constitutional
rights in the administration of state tax laws).
derived from our system of federalism and comity.

This barrier is
The United

States Supreme Court noted the following:
The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of
state governments which should at all times actuate
the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to
interfere . . . with their fiscal operations, require
that such relief should be denied in every case where
the asserted federal right may be preserved without it
(emphasis added).
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McNarv, 454 U.S. at 108. Thus, as long as the state provides an
adequate remedy, any challenge—including one based upon § 1983—
cannot be brought to a federal court.

McNarv, 454 U.S. at 113.

Accordingly, the issue in the present case is whether a
state is required by federal law to provide a forum for federal
claims that would not otherwise be heard in a federal court.
However, the cases cited above bolster the proposition that a
state should have no obligation to create additional remedies
concerning the payment of taxes beyond those provided in the
state statutes.10
In the instant case, the Utah legislature has already
created an adequate and efficient remedy for taxpayers who
contest their assessments.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-301 allows

taxpayers to pay the disputed amounts under protest and then
bring an action in the tax division of the appropriate district
court to determine the validity of the tax.

If the decision goes

in favor of the taxpayer, the taxpayer is entitled to a refund of
the amount paid under protest.

See Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-301

10

. Note that this issue has engendered much confusion
throughout the various states. Nutbrown v. Munn, 811 P. 2d 131 (Or.
1991)(a § 1983 challenge against state taxes was improper because
state provided an adequate remedy); Hogan v. Muslof, 471 N.W. 2d
216 (Wis. 1992)(a § 1983 challenge against state taxes was improper
because the state provided a plain, adequate, and complete remedy);
but see Bung's Bar v. Township Council, 502 A.2d 1198 (N.J. Super
1985)(state court has jurisdiction over § 1983 tax claims);
Bloomingdale's Bv Mail Ltd. v. Huddleston, 848 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn.
1992) (a state granted attorney's fees under § 1983 in a state tax
case).
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(1992).

Thus far, the Utah legislature has not incorporated the

§ 1988 action as a remedy available for Utah taxpayers.
Furthermore, it is a sovereign function of the legislature, and
not the judiciary, to determine what remedies are available to
Utah taxpayers.

Thus, because there is no federal requirement

that a state provide a remedy for contesting state taxes beyond
the pay and sue-for-refund remedy provided in Utah Code Ann. §
59-1-301, and because the legislature has not incorporated the
remedy under § 1988 for Utah taxpayers, Petitioner is not
entitled to attorney's fees under his § 1988 claim.
C.

The Tax Assessed Against Petitioner
Does Not Violate the Commerce Clause
Nor 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Because this Court has discretionary power to deny
attorneys' fees in a § 1983 claim, this Court should carefully
consider the Tax Commission's reasoning in upholding the taxes
assessed against Petitioner.

By doing so, the Court should find

that Petitioner's § 1983 and § 1988 claims are not warranted in
this case.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1989 & Supp. 1992).

As indicated in the analysis above, the imposition of the
tax against Petitioner does not discriminate against out-of-state
purchases of tangible personal property.

It is imperative to

note that the underlying transaction in this case involves a
trade-in situation, not an isolated or occasional purchase of
tangible personal property.

As such, all tangible personal

property acquired in trade is tax exempt pursuant to Utah Code
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Ann. § 59-12-104(19) even if the property comes from within or
outside of this state.

However, the subsequent sale or

consumption of all traded-in property, constitutes a legitimate
taxable transaction.

Finding two separate transactions does not

discriminate against interstate commerce.

Therefore, because the

tax imposed upon Petitioner's subsequent use is in no way
connected with the manner in which Petitioner acquired the
equipment, there can be no violation of the federal Civil Rights
Act.
In support of its 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, Petitioner
relates an example stating that if "Knowledge Data (Petitioner)
had purchased used computer equipment in Salt Lake City from the
University of Utah Hospital, no sales tax would have been
collected from the University of Utah Hospital and no use tax
would have been due from Knowledge Data."
13).

(Brief of Appellant at

This argument is correct so long as the transaction from

the University of Utah Hospital to Petitioner is an actual sale,
and not a trade-in situation.

However, because the facts of this

case indicate that Petitioner acquired the used equipment as part
of a trade-in, Petitioner's example cannot be considered as an
appropriate analogy.

In fact, if Petitioner in its example

actually received equipment in trade from the University of Utah
Hospital, and subsequently used the equipment for its own
business purposes, the Auditing Division would assess a tax on
that transaction.

Therefore, Petitioner cannot claim that the
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tax violates the Commerce Clause unfairly discriminating against
non-Utah entities because all tangible personal property taken in
trade is received tax exempt.
this case.

The Commission is consistent in

Subsequent sale or consumption of the equipment

constitutes a separate taxable transaction.
Finally, this Court has already held that attorneys' fees
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 are not allowed if a trial court
makes an erroneous factual determination when applying the
determination to a statutory provision.

See Kelsev v. Hanson,

818 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

In Kelsev a trial court

judge improperly determined that a plaintiff was able to bear the
costs of filing a divorce as set out in Utah Code Ann. § 21-7-3
and § 21-7-4.

On appeal the plaintiff argued that her right of

access to the courts had been violated given the erroneous
determination of her ability to pay, and sued to recover her
attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1988.

This Court held

that the trial court's erroneous factual determination of her
financial status, a determination that the court was required to
make in applying § 21-7-4, did not constitute a civil rights
violation.

Id. at 592. As such, the Court denied attorney's

fees.

This Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would

Id.

subject all erroneous state court decisions to be construed as
civil rights violations.

Id.

In the present case, the Tax Commission made the factual
determination that Petitioner did not qualify for the "isolated
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or occasional" sales tax exemption given the nature of the tradein situation.

However, if this Court finds that this factual

determination was improper, then this Court still should not find
that Petitioner's civil rights have been violated.

Just as in

the Kelsev case, this Court should hold that an erroneous factual
determination applied to a statutory provision does not give rise
to a civil rights violation or attorneys' fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988.

Therefore, this Court should conclude that

Petitioner's request for attorneys' fees are not warranted in
this case.
CONCLUSION
The Tax Commission properly concluded that Petitioner's
subsequent use of the used computer equipment that it acquired in
trade did not qualify for an "isolated or occasional sales"
exemption given the underlying nature of the transaction.

The

stipulated facts clearly show that Petitioner acquired the used
equipment from the out-of-state purchasers as partial
consideration for the sale of new computer equipment.

Although

the initial trade-in transaction is tax exempt pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(19), the subsequent sale or use of the
equipment constitutes a taxable event.

Because Petitioner used

the equipment for its own business purposes instead of holding
the equipment for resale, Petitioner became the ultimate consumer
of the equipment and is liable for the sales tax.

The tax

assessed against Petitioner does not discriminate against
39

interstate commerce, and as a result, Petitioner's request for
attorney's fees must be denied.

Therefore, this Court should

affirm the sales tax, interest, and penalties assessed against
j-Y

Petitioner.

u^r

DATED thi

day of June, 1993.

GALE K. FRANCIS'
Assistant Attorney General

40

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the abo\^/
Brief of Respondent was mailed, postage pre-paid on this rj?
day of

1993 to the following:
R. Bruce Johnson
David J. Crapo
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPENDIX 1

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(14) (1992):
(a) "Use" means the exercise of any right or power over
tangible personal property under Subsection 59-12-103(1),
incident to the ownership or the leasing of that
property, item, or service.
(b) "Use" does not include the sale, display,
demonstration, or trial of that property in the regular
course of business and held for resale.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1992):
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount
paid or charged for the following:
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made
within the state;
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(14) (1992):
(14) isolated or occasional sales by persons not
regularly engaged in business, except the sale of
vehicles or vessels required to be titled or registered
under the laws of this state;
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(19) (1992):
(19) tangible personal property, other than money, traded
in as full or part payment of the purchase price, except
that for purposes of calculating sales or use tax upon
vehicles not sold by a vehicle dealer, trade-ins are
limited to other vehicles only, and the tax is based upon
the then existing fair market value of the vehicle being
sold and the vehicle being traded in, as determined by
the commission;
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-l(9) (1989 & Supp. 1992):
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause shown, from
lengthening or shortening any time period prescribed in
this chapter, except those time periods established for
judicial review.
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-13 (1989 & Supp 1992):
(l)(a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued
for which review by the agency or by a superior agency under
Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order would
otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may file
a written request for reconsideration with the agency, stating
the specific grounds upon which relief is requested.

(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of
the request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial
review of the order.
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the
agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to each party by the
person making the request.
(3)(a) The agency head, or a person designated for that
purpose, shall issue a written order granting the request or
denying the request.
(b)

If the agency head or the person designated for
that purpose does not issue an order within 20 days
after the filing of the request, the request for
reconsideration shall be considered to be denied.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1989 & Supp. 1992):
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of
final agency action within 30 days after the date that the
order constituting the final agency action is issued or is
considered
to
have
been
issued
under
Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b).
Utah Admin. R. R865-19-72S (1992):
A. An even exchange of tangible personal property for tangible
personal property is exempt from tax. When a person takes
tangible personal property as part payment on a sale of
tangible personal property, sales or use tax applies only to
any consideration valued in money which changes hands.
B. For example, if a car is sold for $8,500 and a credit of
$6,500 is allowed for a used car taken in trade, the sales or
use tax applies to the difference, or $2,000 in this example.
Subsequently, when the used car is sold, tax applies to the
selling price less any trade-in at that time.
C. An actual exchange of tangible personal property between
two persons must be made before this exemption applies. . .

APPENDIX 2

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
KNOWLEDGE DATA SYSTEMS,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND FINAL DECISION

v.
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

Appeal No. 91-0934
)

Respondent.

Account No. D51752

)

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
for

a formal

hearing

on

April

13,

1992.

Alan

Hennebold,

Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the
Commission.
participated

Gary S. Kueltzo, manager of state and local taxes,
by

telephone

for

Petitioner.

Rick

Carlton,

Assistant Utah Attorney General represented Respondent.
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The tax in question is use tax.

2.

The period in question is July 1987 through June

3.

Respondent

1990.
performed

a

sales

and

use

compliance audit of Petitioner for the period in question.

tax
As

a result of that audit, Respondent assessed additional use tax
in the amount of $15,396.99 plus interest at the statutory ratof 12% per annum.

Appeal No. 91-0934
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Petitioner filed a timely appeal of the foregoing

assessment with the Commission.
5.

Petitioner is in the business of selling computer

hardware and software at retail both inside and outside Utah.
6.

Petitioner

sold

a

computer

system

to

the

University of Minnesota Hospital and Clinic and took in trade
used computer hardware which Petitioner had previously sold to
them.
7.

The

University

of

Minnesota

business of selling new or used computer

is

not

in

the

hardware, but rather

is a patient, care facility.
8.
*ff

The equipment

Petitioner took

in trade was used

Petitioner in its business in Utah and was booked to a fixed

asset

account

and

was

not

held

for

subsequent

sale

in

an

inventory account.
9.

ICI

America

is

in

the

business

of

selling

wholesale pharmaceutical supplies and is not in the business of
selling new or used computer hardware.
10.

Petitioner

purchased used computer hardware from

ICI In coniunction with providing a new computer system to ICI.
11.

Petitioner

hardware itt7 its trade

used

a

or business

portion
and held

of

the

computer

a portion of the

hardware for resale in its inventory account.
12.

Neither

the University of Minnesota

nor

ICI

is

registered with the Utah Department of Revenue to sell tangible
personal property at retail in Utah.
-2-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Sales tax is levied on the purchaser for the amount
paid or charged for retail sales of tangible personal property
made within the state.

(Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103(1)(a)).

Sales tax is not

imposed

on isolated or occasional

sales by persons not regularly engaged in business.

(Utah Code

Ann, §59-12-104(14)).
Use tax is levied on the purchaser for the amount paid
or

charged

for

tangible

feofisumed in Utah.
Generally,
strictly,

and

in

personal

property

stored,

used

or

(Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103(l)(l)).
taxing
favor

statutes
of

the

are

taxpayer

to

be

construed

where

doubtful.

(Pacific Intermountain v. State Tax Commission, 8 Utah 144,
146; 329 P.2d 650 (1958)).

However, statutes which provide for

exemptions

to general taxation provisions are also

construed,

and

entitlement

the

taxpayer

has

to the exemption.

strictly

the burden of showing its

(Parsons Asphalt

Products v.

Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980)).
DECISION AND ORDER
The facts underlying this dispute are not £t issue.
In summary, Petitioner took used equipment back in trade from
the

University

of

Minnesota

and

ICI

Petitioner's own business operations.

America,

for

use

in

Petitioner argues that

the transactions are exempt from sales and use tax as isolated
or

occasional

sales.

Respondent

-3-

argues

that

Petitioner s

Appeal No. 91-0934
initial purchase of the equipment was exempt from sales tax,
but that its subsequent use of the equipment is subject to use
tax.
Utah Code Ann.

S59-12-103( 1) (a) levies sales tax on

the purchaser of tangible personal property sold within Utah.
In this case, the parties agree that no sales tax may be levied
on the transactions in question because the sales took place/
outside Utah.

However, Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103(1X1) levies

an alternative "use" tax on the purchaser of tangible personal
property stored, used, or consumed in Utah.
The equipment at issue in this case was used in Utah,
and is therefore subject to use tax unless it falls within one
of the specific exemptions set forth by statute.
relies

upon

the

exemption

found

in

Utah

Petitioner
Code

Ann.

§59-12-104(14), which exempts isolated or occasional sales by
persons not regularly engaged in business from sales and use
tax.

However, it is not the sale of the equipment which is

taxable, but only Petitioner's subsequent use of that equipment.

-4-
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Based

on

the foregoing,

the

Commission

finds that

Petitioner's use of used computer hardware taken in trade from
the University of Minnesota and ICI America is subject to use
tax under Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act.
assessment is therefore affirmed.

DATED this ^

Respondent's audit

It is so ordered.

* 1992.

day of Oc&Vt^'

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.
ABSENT
R.H. Hansen
Chairman

Roger 0. Tew
Commissioner

B. Pacheco
Commissioner

S. Blaine Willes
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(1),
63-46b-14(2)(a).
AH/SJ/3507W

v
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Decision to the following:
Knowledge Data Systems
c/o Richard Wolfley
102 West 500 South, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT
84101
Gary S. Kueltzo, Esq.
30 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3600
Chicago, IL 60606
Craig Sandberg
Assistant Director, Auditing
Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
James H. Rogers
Director, Auditing Div.
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
Rick Carlton
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
DATED this

Vtf
<?%

f
day
d a y oof

fJOJL£SI&
> 7>r£*V^
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APPENDIX 3

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE* TAX COMMISSION
KNOWLEDGE DATA SYSTEMS,
Petitioner,
ORDER
v.
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

Appeal No. 91-0934
Account No. D51752

Respondent.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax commission
upon a Petition for Reconsideration, dated November 16, 1992,
filed by the Petitioner as a result of the Commission's final
-decision, dated October *». 1392.
FINDINGS
1.

Utah

Administrative

Rule

that A .Petition fox Reconsideration "will
reconsideration
discovery

of

either m mistake
new

evidence."

RB61-1-5A(P) provides
allege as grounds for

in lav

Under

ox

this

fact, or
rule,

the

the
Tax

:Xonmissiorr»ey exercise it» discretion In pasting -or .denying a
Petition fox Reconsideration.

2.
raises

In its Petition For Reconsideration, Petitioner

what

it

Commission'G

considers

prior

acknowledged

by

to

be

decision.

Petitioner,

such

errors

of

However/
alleged

fact
as

in

the

generally

errors

were

not

material to the Commission's prior decision in this matter.
3.

She primary point raised by Petitioner's Request

For Reconsideration is as follows:
the used computer equipment

Petitioner's acquisition of

in question was the result of

isolated or occasional sales by the University of Minnesota and
ICI.

Utah

Code

Ann.

$59-12-104(14)

occasional sales from sales tax.

exempts

isolated

or

According to Petitioner the

same exemption must be applied to Petitioner's subsequent use
trff the equipmentf so as to preclude imposition of use tax.
The

Commission

carefully

considered

the

foregoing

argument in reaching its initial decision in this matter.
Commission

has

again

considered

Petitioner's

argument

connection with Petitioner's Request for Tteconsideraticn.
Commission

continues

to believe

The
in
The

that although Petitioner's

Initial purchase of the subject property is not subject to
sales tax. Petitioner's subsequent use of the equipment in Utah
Is subject to Utah's use tax.

DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order
of

the Utah

State Tax Commission that the Petition for

Reconsideration is denied.

PATED this

/r)

It is so ordered.

day of

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX
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COTWISSIONN

Roger 0. Tew
Commissioner

Hansen
Chairman

fe B. Pacheco
Commissioner

~

'

S. Blaine Willes
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of the final
order to file with the Supreme cotxrt a petition for judicial
review. Utah Code tan. SS63-4£b-13(l). 63-46b-l4<2)U), -AH/Sj/3703V
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Seclvion to tfca fallowing:
Knowledge Data Systems
c/o UleKara Wo If lay "b&U« He^sctW
102 West 500 South, Suite 600
*
Salt Lake City, UT
84101
Craig Sandberg
Assistant Director, Auditing
Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City. UT
64134
Janes H. Rogers
Director, Auditing Div.
iiebex X. Wells 3ldg.
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
Mark Wainwright
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State. #1100
Salt .Lake City. UT
ami

ft
DATED this

ftf

1
day of fjg 'tfr'Mtf
SBCXBX

c
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